With the US-Israel war on Iran now entering its third week, several countries have seen their foreign policies put to the test. Among those facing the greatest challenges is Pakistan. A close ally of Saudi Arabia and a neighbour of Iran — sharing hundreds of kilometres of border with it — Pakistan has found itself stuck between a rock and a hard place.
Given its Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) with Saudi Arabia, which necessitates a military response to any act of aggression against either party, Pakistan’s foreign policy calculations require significant recalibration. Pakistan has maintained a long-standing relationship with Saudi Arabia, having provided military support to the kingdom for decades. In addition, a significant number of Pakistani nationals work in Saudi Arabia, sending home crucial remittances that support Pakistan’s domestic economy. Pakistan’s trade volume with Saudi Arabia amounts to nearly US$5 billion, constituting a substantial share of its external trade.
Moreover, Saudi Arabia has long been a provider of financial assistance to Pakistan, which has struggled with persistent economic challenges. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has also invested in Pakistan’s mineral sector and other key infrastructure projects, including electricity, further increasing its strategic importance to Islamabad. The SMDA emerged in the immediate aftermath of an Israeli missile attack on Qatar, signalling Saudi Arabia’s growing uncertainty about the United States’ commitment to the security of its Gulf partners. This arrangement benefited Pakistan as well, as it translated into increased Saudi investments in the country.
On the other hand, Pakistan and Iran also share a long and complex history. Bilateral trade between the two stands at roughly US$3 billion, with both sides aiming to increase it to US$10 billion. Prior to the war, ties had been gradually improving, evidenced by 25 high-level bilateral visits between officials from both countries over the past two years. At the same time, tensions have periodically surfaced, with 2024 witnessing a brief tit-for-tat exchange of missile strikes between the two nations. Nonetheless, the geographic proximity of the two countries makes their relationship important.
Pakistan’s Limitations
In the current scenario, with Saudi Arabia sustaining multiple strikes from Iran, there is a possibility that Riyadh may turn to Pakistan for military support. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has already expressed his country’s “full solidarity and support” for Saudi Arabia. At the same time, Sharif placed a call to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian following the announcement of Mojtaba Khamenei as Iran’s new supreme leader. The central question, therefore, is: what considerations must Pakistan weigh if it were to come to Saudi Arabia’s defence?
For Islamabad, several constraints complicate any decision to become directly involved in the conflict. First, while Pakistan may be obligated under the SMDA to support Saudi Arabia, it is already engaged in ongoing hostilities with Afghanistan, an issue that has received comparatively little attention amid news coverage dominated by the Iran conflict. Tensions with Afghanistan have imposed significant military and operational costs on Pakistan, requiring Islamabad to concentrate substantial security resources on that front. Entering a second conflict against another state would severely strain Pakistan’s military capabilities and resources.
Second, Pakistan cannot afford to ignore its geography and open a sustained war front with Iran. Iran has demonstrated its military capabilities, challenging American, Israeli, and Gulf defence systems alike. In addition, Tehran has shown a strong willingness to strike its adversaries forcefully. For Pakistan, the risk of prolonged tensions with neighbouring Iran is especially unattractive, given its simultaneous security challenges with Afghanistan and India.
Third, Pakistan must also factor in domestic political sensitivities, including a sizeable segment of its population that is sympathetic towards Iran. Pakistan’s Shia population constitutes roughly 20 percent of the country, at approximately 35 million people, with longstanding religious and social ties to Iran. Many Pakistani Shias regularly travel to Iran, and some have previously fought alongside Iran-backed forces in Syria. Alienating this constituency by participating in a conflict against Iran could prove destabilising for Pakistan, which has historically experienced significant sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia communities.
Difficult Decisions
For Pakistan, as for many other countries, including India and several Gulf states, there are no easy answers in this war. Despite the constraints outlined above, Pakistan remains heavily reliant on Saudi Arabia for aid and economic support, particularly at a time when its domestic economic situation remains fragile. Moreover, Pakistan cannot afford disruptions to fuel imports from Gulf nations, which supply a significant share of its energy requirements.
The fact that Pakistan has negotiated with Iran to ensure safe passage for fuel shipments through the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates that, despite offering political support to Saudi Arabia, it continues to engage pragmatically with Iran to safeguard its energy security. Another factor working in Pakistan’s favour is the presence of substantial Chinese investments under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). For Iran, which exports most of its oil to China and has reportedly received intelligence support from Beijing during the conflict, targeting Chinese investments in Pakistan and alienating a key partner would be counterproductive. This is particularly true at a time when Tehran faces increasingly strained regional relations following its attacks on several states across the Middle East.
Ultimately, Pakistan appears to be pursuing a cautious and calibrated approach towards both Iran and Saudi Arabia. Islamabad is likely to avoid escalation, particularly as it has introduced domestic austerity measures to conserve energy resources. Direct military involvement is therefore an outcome Pakistan would prefer to avoid, opting instead for diplomatic engagement aimed at easing tensions. Saudi Arabia, too, appears hesitant to formally invoke the defence agreement, as doing so would require a declaration of war — an escalation Riyadh is keen to avoid in order to prevent deeper entanglement in US-Israeli military action against Iran.
- About the author: Mohammed Sinan Siyech is a Non–Resident Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
- Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.
