The Εurasian Times By Prakash Nanda
The signing of the interim Indo-US Trade Agreement on February 6, 2026, signals a revival of momentum in the steadily deepening security and defense partnership between New Delhi and Washington, which had faced temporary setbacks.
Saying that the US would “learn” from the conflict, he asserted that the US-India defence relationship is now on a “ steeply upward trajectory”.In between, the U.S. Consulate General Chennai, with support from the U.S.-India Strategic Partnership Forum (USISPF), hosted the U.S.-India Space Business Forum in Bengaluru on February 10-11. The forum was the flagship event of the first U.S. Trade Mission to India focused on commercial space, which brought 23 Executives from 14 leading American space companies to India to engage with more than 200 government and industry participants from both countries. As only the second space-focused trade mission ever organized by the U.S. Department of Commerce, and the first of its kind to India, the initiative reinforced U.S. leadership in commercial space innovation and underscored the growing momentum of the U.S.-India partnership in the global space economy. Along with the developmental goals, the forum would strive to achieve through cooperation and “cocreation” (of technologies and assets). The Americans were also reported to have highlighted that “the space is underpinning national security,” and that the two countries should move forward together in this regard. Incidentally, any bilateral or even multilateral cooperation on space almost inherently involves security dimensions due to the dual-use nature of space technology. Even when cooperation is initially aimed at scientific exploration, it often evolves to include strategic, defense, and security aspects. After all, space has transitioned from a tool for socio-economic development to what is said to be “a critical fifth domain of warfare”, alongside land, sea, air, and cyber world. So much so that experts now say that space is not only a physical domain – the ‘eighth continent’ to be controlled and exploited – but also an inescapable component of modern statecraft and overall power projection. Spacepower already forms the backbone of contemporary warfare, enabling everything from weather forecasting to multi-domain Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) and missile defense. In other words, as space has become more congested, contested, and militarized, safeguarding the space environment has become highly imperative. It is not surprising, therefore, that on February 13, the Euro-Atlantic Security Leadership Group (EASLG), which operates as an independent and informal initiative, with participants from the United States, Canada, Russia, and fifteen European countries, issued a significant statement. It says, “Without practical steps to prevent conflict in space, the danger of nuclear catastrophe—by design or by blunder—grows significantly. The risk is further exacerbated by uncertainty over the future of nuclear arms control, allegations of plans to place nuclear weapons in space, and the possibility that one or more nuclear-armed states may resume explosive nuclear weapon tests”. The EASLG has appealed to all the major militaries, including those of India, China, Japan, Germany, and Russia, to start a dialogue among themselves on how to avoid a space war and utilize space peacefully for developmental activities. Five, there is the NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar (NISAR) project, which provides advanced Earth observation data for both civilian and security applications. Six, in 2023, India signed the “Artemis Accords” with the US, which set out non-binding principles for lunar exploration, transparency, interoperability, and resource utilization. This move is said to depart from India’s traditional preference for a multilateral, legally binding framework negotiated through the United Nations, especially given that it is one of the few countries to have ratified the 1979 Moon Agreement. Seven, in the same year of 2023, the partnership gained further strategic depth with the launch of the U.S.-India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), which included civil, commercial, and defense space cooperation. Accordingly, the U.S. Space Force has partnered with Indian startups Bharat Semi and 3rdiTech, with support from the India Semiconductor Mission, to establish India’s first national ecurity–focused semiconductor fabrication facility at Kolkata. Incidentally, during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s February 2025 visit to Washington, iCET was rebranded as the U.S.-India TRUST (Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology) initiative. TRUST builds on iCET’s cross-sectoral framework while placing greater emphasis on artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and critical minerals. During this visit, Prime Minister Modi and U.S. President Donald Trump also reaffirmed the centrality of space cooperation under this new initiative, including in civil, commercial, and human spaceflight activities. They launched the INDUS Innovation Bridge, modeled after INDUS-X, to facilitate joint ventures and investment in emerging technologies, including space. However, despite the increasing convergence in space cooperation between New Delhi and Washington as noted above, there remain some areas where the two partners agree to disagree. India may have obtained in 2018 the Strategic Trade Authorisation-1 (STA-1) status, moving from Tier-2 to Tier-1 of the U.S. Commerce Department’s license exception list, a status that places it on par with NATO allies, and allows for license-free, expedited access to advanced, dual-use, and sensitive U.S. technologies in the defense, space, and high-tech sectors. But India continues to face hurdles from the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and Export Administration Regulations (EAR). And on its part, India has not supported the U.S. in some international forums on some matters relating to Space. It abstained from voting on the 2022 U.S.-led UN resolution calling for a ban on debris-generating direct-ascent ASAT missile testing. It also abstained on the 2024 resolution on reducing space threats through norms, rules, and principles of responsible behaviors, a measure that received overwhelming support from the United States and its European allies. India’s rationale is said to be its uneasiness with norm-making processes it perceives as “exclusionary or insufficiently representative”. And this has been seen as a manifestation of its policy of maintaining “ Strategic Autonomy”. Viewed thus, one may conclude with the remarks of Dimitrios Stroikos, Head of the Space Policy Programme, LSE IDEAS, London School of Economics and Political Science, that “while India is increasingly aligning with U.S. initiatives on operational and technological fronts, its approach to space governance remains cautious, characterized by selective engagement, normative ambivalence, and reticent behavior”.
- Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
- CONTACT: prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com
